18 de dezembro de 2018

La acción humanitaria en 2017–2018: una acción múltiple pero insuficiente


El IECAH presenta la publicación “La acción humanitaria en 2017–2018: una acción múltiple pero insuficiente”. Un informe en el que a través de siete artículos se realiza un balance de acción humanitaria en este bienio.

Durante 2017-2018, la acción humanitaria se vio más sobrepasada que nunca ante unos problemas para cuya resolución careció de capacidades suficientes. Estuvo sometida a una fortísima presión para encarar tareas que muchas veces suponían una dejación de responsabilidad por parte de los Estados, teniendo además que ajustarse a las directrices de las estrategias de seguridad de los principales actores.

Los conflictos y las situaciones de violencia siguieron incrementando su complejidad y los desastres mostraron patrones cada vez más impredecibles, recurrentes y extremos, consecuencia del cambio climático.

En 2017 se volvió a registrar un volumen récord de personas refugiadas (25,4 millones), personas desplazadas (40 millones) y solicitantes de asilo (3,1 millones) como resultado de la persecución, los conflictos, la violencia o las violaciones de los Derechos Humanos y del Derecho Internacional Humanitario. También aumentó el número de quienes estaban en situación de subalimentación crónica, (821 millones). A las tres emergencias nivel tres ya conocidas- en Siria, Irak y Yemen- se añadió en octubre la crisis de personas refugiadas rohinyá, el agravamiento de la situación en la República Democrática del Congo y el grave terremoto y tsunami de Sulawesi (Indonesia), en septiembre de 2018. Otras crisis de carácter crónico ya se han hecho desgraciadamente habituales en el escenario internacional.

La acción humanitaria internacional alcanzó la cifra récord de 27.300 millones de dólares, impulsada por el aumento de fondos privados. Pero las necesidades sin cubrir siguieron creciendo y la cobertura media de los llamamientos fue de solo el 59% –la segunda más baja desde 2008–. En España, comenzó a registrarse cierta recuperación, si bien las cifras distaron mucho de las de hace una década.

http://iecah.org/index.php/articulos/3454-la-accion-humanitaria-en-2017-2018-una-accion-multiple-pero-insuficiente

16 de dezembro de 2018

La Salud en la Cooperacion al Desarrollo 2018

La Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo española tardará más de 15 años en alcanzar la aportación de antes de la crisis si sigue el ritmo actual. El peso de la salud en la AOD española sigue cayendo: España destina un exiguo 2,56% del total de la aportación.

https://www.medicusmundi.es/es/actualidad/noticias/1005/Informe%20Salud%20cooperacion%20desarrollo%202018

https://www.medicusmundi.es/storage/resources/attachments/5c111884116e3_informe-salud-2018.pdf

¿Cuánto le importa a España la salud global?


Un informe de Médicos del Mundo y Medicusmundi denuncia que la ayuda para este sector de la cooperación internacional, con 65,6 millones en 2017, apenas representa el 2,56% del total.

https://elpais.com/autor/alejandra_agudo/a

15 de dezembro de 2018

Interview with Jelisa Peterson

"One thing that I have noticed while taking photographs in many different African settings is how difficult it can be to get candid images of adults. People tend to quickly pose themselves when they notice the lens coming their way. Maintaining dignity is important and for some people this means appearing serious and not smiling."

https://narratio.org/interviews/chapter-2-jelisa-peterson

8 de novembro de 2018

IV MARATÓN DE CUENTOS Biblioteca Pública Palencia



Un saludo queridas contadoras y contadores, mañana viernes 9 de noviembre comienza la inscripción al IV Maratón de Cuentos. Os podréis inscribir hasta el 10 de diciembre. 
El horario será:
* 10.00 a 13.30 – Los coles cuentan
* 17.00 a 20.00 - Abierto a contar infancia / público familiar
* 20.30 a 24.00 – Abierto a contar público adulto + Actividades complementarias ( Charla_Contada sobre el oficio de contar cuentos en África + Relatos de la Travesía )

OS RECORDAMOS LAS CONSIGNAS PARA PARTICIPAR Y LA TEMÁTICA DEL MARATÓN
1. La expresión oral es la protagonista de la actividad, de modo que los cuentos se contarán, no se leerán.
2. Sólo se puede CONTAR, no leer. El tiempo de la presentación será de un máximo de 10 minutos.
3. Se pueden contar cuentos individuales o colectivos.
5. Temática: otros mundos y otras culturas, historias de viajes y travesías en búsqueda de un nuevo hogar, aventuras en las que conocer otros idiomas, otros paisajes, otras comidas, otros climas...relatos e historias que nos ayuden a tener una mirada abierta a lo diferentes, lo desconocido, lo que llega nuevo. Esta temática es un punto de partida, una sugerencia, una invitación...os lleve donde os lleve su contenido.

¿Dónde? En el mostrador de la biblioteca o enviar un Whatsapp o escribir a maratondecuentospalencia@gmail.com
¿Datos? Nombre | Edad | Teléfono | Mail | Cuento para infancia o para público adulto | Individual o colectivo
 
MÁS INFORMACIÓN    691895368 / 659841544 o escríbenos a  maratondecuentospalencia@gmail.com


27 de outubro de 2018

Where crime compounds conflict


Understanding northern Mozambique’s vulnerabilities


Read more:

http://globalinitiative.net/northern_mozambique_violence/

15 de outubro de 2018

DEMOCRATAS BRASILEIROS, UNI-VOS!

Por Boaventura de Sousa Santos*

A democracia brasileira está à beira do abismo. O golpe institucional que se iniciou com o impeachment da Presidente Dilma e prosseguiu com a injusta prisão do ex-presidente Lula da Silva está quase consumado. A consumação do golpe significa hoje algo muito diferente do que foi inicialmente pensado por muitas das forças políticas e sociais que o protagonizaram ou dele não discordaram. Algumas dessas forças agiram ou reagiram no convencimento genuíno de que o golpe visava regenerar a democracia brasileira por via da luta contra a corrupção; outros entendiam que era o modo de neutralizar a ascensão das classses populares a um nível de vida que mais tarde ou mais cedo ameaçaria não apenas as elites, mas também as classes médias (muitas delas produto das políticas redistributivas contra as quais agora se viravam). Obviamente, nenhum destes grupos falava de golpe e ambos acreditavam que a democracia era estável. Não se deram conta de que havia três bombas-relógio construídas em tempos muito diversos, mas podendo explodir simultaneamente. Se tal ocorresse, a democracia revelaria toda a sua fragilidade e possivelmente não sobreviveria.

A primeira bomba-relógio foi construída no tempo colonial e no processo de independência, foi acionada de modo particularmente brutal várias vezes ao longo da história moderna do Brasil, mas nunca foi eficazmente desativada. Trata-se do DNA de uma sociedade dividida entre senhores e servos, elites oligárquicas e povo ignaro, entre a normalidade institucional e a violência extra-institucional, uma sociedade extremamente desigual em que a desigualdade socioeconômica nunca se separou do preconceito racial e sexual. Pese embora todos os erros e defeitos, os governos do PT foram os que mais contribuíram para desativar essa bomba, criando políticas de redistribuição social e de luta contra a discriminação racial e sexual  sem precedentes na história do Brasil. Para a desativação ser eficaz seria necessário que essas políticas fossem sustentáveis e permanecessem  por várias gerações a fim de a memória da extrema desigualdade e crua discriminação deixar de ser políticamente reativável. Como tal não aconteceu, as políticas tiveram outros efeitos, mas não o efeito de desativar a bomba-relógio. Pelo contrário, provocaram quem tinha poder para a ativar  e a fazê-lo quanto antes, antes que fosse tarde demais e as ameaças para as elites e classes médias se tornassem irreversíveis. A avassaladora demonização do PT pelos média oligopolistas, sobretudo a partir de 2013, revelou a urgência com que se queria pôr fim à ameaça.

A segunda bomba-relógio foi construída na ditadura militar que governou o país entre 1964 e 1985 e no modo como foi negociada a transição para a democracia. Consistiu em manter as Forças Armadas (FFAA) como última garantia da ordem política interna e não apenas como garantia da defesa contra uma ameaça estrangeira, como é normal nas democracias.  “Último” quer dizer em estado de prontidão para intervir em qualquer momento definido pelas FFAA como  excepcional. Por isso, não foi possível punir os crimes da ditadura (ao contrário da Argentina, mas na mesma linha do Chile) e, pelo contrário, os militares impuseram aos constituintes de 1988, 28 parágrafos sobre o estatuto constitucional das FFAA. Por isso, também muitos dos que governaram durante a ditadura puderam continuar a governar como políticos eleitos no congresso democrático. Apelar à intervenção militar e à ideologia militarista autoritária ficou sempre latente, pronta a explodir. Por isso, quando os militares começaram a intervir mais ativamente na política interna nos últimos meses (por exemplo, apelando à permanência da prisão de Lula), isso pareceu normal dadas as circunstâncias excepcionais.

A terceira bomba-relógio foi  construída nos EUA a partir de 2009 (golpe institucional nas Honduras), quando o governo norte-americano se deu conta de que o sub-continente estava fugindo de seu controle mantido sem interrupção (com excepção da “distração” em Cuba) ao longo de todo o século XX.  A perda de controle continha, agora, dois perigos para a segurança dos EUA:  o questionamento do acesso ilimitado aos imensos recursos naturais e a presença cada vez mais preocupante da China no continente, o país que, muito antes de Trump, fora considerado a nova ameaça global à unipolaridade internacional conquistada pelos EUA depois da queda do Muro de Berlim. A bomba começou então a ser construída, não apenas com os tradicionais mecanismos da CIA e da Escola Militar das Américas, mas sobretudo com novos mecanismos da chamada defesa da “democracia amiga da economia de mercado”.  Isto significou que, além do governo dos EUA,  a intervenção poderia incluir organizações da sociedade civil vinculadas aos interesses econômicos dos EUA (por exemplo, as financiadas pelos irmãos Koch). Portanto, uma defesa da democracia condicionada pelos interesses do mercado e, por isso, descartável sempre que os interesses o exigissem. Esta bomba-relógio mostrou que já estava operando no Brasil a partir dos protestos de 2013. Foi melhorada com a oportunidade histórica que a corrupção política lhe ofereceu. O grande investimento norte-americano no sistema judicial vinha do início dos anos de 1990, na Rússia pós-soviética e também na Colômbia,  entre muitos outros países. Quando a questão não é de “regime change”, a intervenção tem de ser despolitizada. A luta contra a corrupção é isso. Sabemos que os dados mais importantes da operação Lava Jato foram fornecidos pelo Departamento de Justiça dos EUA. O resto foi resultado da miserável “delação premiada”. O juiz Sergio Moro transformou-se no agente principal dessa intervenção imperial. Só que a luta contra a corrupção por si só não seria suficiente no caso do Brasil.  Era suficiente para neutralizar a aliança do Brasil com a China no âmbito dos BRICS, mas não para abrir plenamente o Brasil aos interesses das multinacionais.  É  que, em resultado das políticas dos últimos quarenta anos (e algumas vindas da ditadura), o Brasil teve até há pouco imensas reservas de petróleo fora do mercado internacional,  tem duas importantes empresas públicas e dois bancos públicos, e 57 universidades federais completamente gratuitas. Ou seja, é um país muito longe do ideal neoliberal, e para dele o aproximar é preciso uma intervenção mais autoritária, dada a aceitaçao das políticas sociais do PT pela população brasileira. E assim surgiu Jair Bolsonaro como candidato “preferido dos mercados”. O que ele diz sobre as mulheres, os negros ou os homosexuais ou a tortura pouco interessa aos “mercados”, desde que a sua política econômica seja semelhante à do Pinochet no Chile. E tudo leva  a crer que será porque o seu economista-chefe tem conhecimento direto dessa infame política chilena. O político de extrema-direita norte-americano Steve Bannon apoia Bolsonaro, mas é apenas o balcão da frente do apoio imperial. Os analistas do mundo digital estão surpreeendidos com a excelência da técnica da campanha bolsonarista nas redes sociais. Inclui micro-direcionamento, marketing digital ultra-personalizado, manipulação de sentimentos, fake news etc. Para quem assistiu na semana passada na televisão pública norte-americana (PBS) ao documentário intitulado “Dark Money”, sobre a influência do dinheiro nas eleições dos EUA, pode concluir facilmente que as fake news (sobre crianças, armas e comunismo etc.) no Brasil são tradução em português das que o “dark money” faz circular nos EUA para promover ou destruir candidatos. Se alguns dos centros de emissão de mensagens estão em Miami e Lisboa é pouco relevante (apesar de verdadeiro).

A vitória de Jair Bolsonaro no segundo turno significará a detonação simultânea destas três bombas-relógio. Dificilmente a democracia brasileira sobreviverá à destruição que causarão. Por isso, o segundo turno é uma questão de regime, um autêntico plebiscito sobre se o Brasil deve continuar a ser uma democracia ou passar a ser uma ditadura de tipo novo. Um livro meu, muito recente, circula hoje bastante no Brasil. Intitula-se “Esquerdas do Mundo, uni-vos!”. Mantenho tudo o que digo aí, mas o momento obriga-me a um outro apelo mais amplo: Democratas brasileiros, uni-vos! É certo que a direita brasileira revelou nos últimos dois anos um apego muito condicional à democracia, ao alinhar com o comportamento descontrolado (mas bem controlado em outras paragens) de parte do judiciário, mas estou certo de que largos setores dela não estarão dispostos a suicidar-se para servir “os mercados”.  Têm de unir-se ativamente na luta contra Bolsonaro. Sei que muitos não poderão recomendar o voto em Haddad, tal é o seu ódio ao PT. Basta que digam: não votem em Bolsonaro. Imagino e espero que isso seja dito, publicamente e muitas vezes, por alguém que em tempos foi um grande amigo meu, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ex-presidente do Brasil e, antes disso, um grande sociólogo e doutor Honoris Causa  pela Universidade de Coimbra, de quem eu fiz o elogio. Todos e todas (as mulheres não vão ter nos próximos tempos um papel mais decisivo para as suas vidas e a de todos os brasileiros) devem envolver-se ativamente e porta a porta. E é bom que tenham em mente duas coisas. Primeiro, o fascismo de massas nunca foi feito de massas fascistas, mas sim de minorias fascistas bem organizadas que souberam capitalizar nas aspirações legítimas dos cidadãos comuns que desejam viver com um emprego digno e em segurança. Segundo, ao ponto que chegamos, para assegurar uma certo regresso à normalidade democrática não basta  que Haddad ganhe, tem de ganhar por uma margem folgada.

*Boaventura de Sousa Santos é sociólogo e intelectual português

Fonte: https://www.publico.pt/2018/10/10/mundo/opiniao/democratas-brasileiros-univos-1846737

13 de outubro de 2018

Mozambique, las 'nuevas guerras' por los recursos

El país africano lleva décadas de conflictos desde su independencia. Tras un periodo de relativa paz con el mismo partido desde 1994, ahora surgen nuevos conflictos por los recursos naturales.

https://www.eitb.eus/es/radio/radio-euskadi/programas/graffiti/audios/detalle/5911199/audio-mozambique-nuevas-guerras-recursos------------/

9 de outubro de 2018

Quem também abriu champanhe pela chegada da Exxon-Mobil a Angoche


Por: Marcelo Mosse

Ontem, quando o Ministro Max Tonela (Recursos Minerais e Energia) e o DG da ExxonMobil, Joe Evans, selavam o contrato para o início da prospecção e pesquisa de petróleo pela gigante americana na costa de Angoche (dois blocos) e no Delta do Zambeze (um bloco), nalgumas “boardrooms” em Maputo houve quem também celebrasse. Não ainda a grande e à francesa. Mas com alguma cautela. A Exxon iniciar suas operações em Angoche representa uma grande oportunidade para representantes das elites locais, muitos deles ligados ao partido Frelimo. O grupo já estava no terreno em démarche para garantir que seja envolvido numa eventual reabilitação (ou construção de uma nova) do porto local capaz de suportar operações de logística da Exxon agora (e mais tarde da Eni, que também ganhou um bloco de pesquisa na costa de Angoche).

O lobby nampulense (ou angocheano) envolve figuras de relevo na Frelimo: José Abudo, José Mateus Kathupa, Eduardo Nihia, General Frazão, General Jorge Khalau, Aires Aly, Rosário Mualeia, António Assane e Magalhães Abramugy (este já teve uma posição de destaque na Renamo). A lista é enorme. Estes nomes são os mais sonantes e representam duas entidades: uma firma denominada Gedena SA e outra chamada Angoche Desenvolvimento e Logística SA (ADL). Juntaram-se num consórcio que recebeu a designação de  Padáry Ya Málany (Porto de Málany). Malány é o local onde está situado o velho cais de Angoche, que recebia embarcações comerciais. No passado dia 31 de Agosto, José Abudo foi a Angoche apresentar o projecto do ‘Porto Logístico de Angoche”.  O consórcio assinou este ano um memorando de entendimento com os CFM que lhe coloca na dianteira das preferências para uma adjudicação do projecto da base logística de Angoche.

Os promotores esperam que sua ventura não venha a ser preterida por outros interesses, como aconteceu com a Muyake, que foi afastada do porto de Pemba para dar lugar a actual Base Logística, agora em construção a  um rítmo diferente do projectado. A Muyake (de Leonardo Simão, antigo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Simão Muhai e Fundação Joaquim Chissano) tinha realizado estudos para implatação de uma base logística em Pemba mas foi afastada quando o Governo optou por viabilizar um consórcio entre a ENH Logistics, a angolana SONLis e o nigeriano de origem italiana Gabrielle Volpi. A Muyake meteu o caso em Tribunal e o Governo foi condenado a pagar 60 milhões de USD de indemnização (ainda não paga).

O anúncio da chegada da Exxon à Angoche encheu de satisfação também os nativos e habitantes da cidade. Um antigo sultanato estabelecido como centro de trocas comerciais nas rotas do Indico, Angoche cresceu à volta do seu pequeno porto onde ancoravam todos os negócios locais. O porto funciona hoje a meio gás. Está sob a alçada dos CFM (isso explica o memorando de entendimento). Sua reabilitação de raiz vai “tirar Angoche do marasmo”, diz o régulo Sabino, da zona do Ínguri, a mais populosa da cidade. Sabino quer que os primeiros beneficiários do investimento da Exxon (e depois da ENI) sejam a cidade de Angoche e suas populações. “Chega de todo o bolo ficar em Maputo”. Para ele, a revitalização do porto vai fazer com que Angoche recupere sua aura do passado, que também se alimentava do cajú.  O Governador de Nampula, Victor Borges, está igualmente entusiasmado com a perspectiva de ganhos directos do investimento da Exxon na economia local de Angoche. “Já era sem tempo”, disse ele, que espera que o processo decisório sobre esta matéria tenha em conta a inclusão das elites locais ou seus representantes.

26 de setembro de 2018

Epistemologias do sul: conflitos, resistências e alternativas de vida frente ao capitalismo extractivista e financeiro






SEMINÁRIO
28 de setembro de 2018, 15h00
Sala 2, CES | Alta

Resumo

Territórios em conflito: investigação, formação e acção para o fortalecimento de capacidade e a construção de alternativas de vida é um projecto de investigação-acção liderado pelo consórcio Gernika Gogoratuz (GGG) e Gernikatik Mundura (GM), País Basco, em parceria com o Instituto Hegoa da Universidade do País Basco, o Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal, a WLSA Moçambique e a Universidade de Tolima, Colômbia.
Este projecto tem três grandes objectivos. O primeiro é promover um processo de investigação-acção que permita compreender as complexidades presentes nos territórios e os conflitos gerados e alimentados pela ordem neoliberal, patriarcal e extractivista levada a cabo pelas corporações transnacionais. O segundo, é  aprender mais sobre as diversas formas de resistência e alternativas de vida que estão em marcha e fazem frente ao poder transnacional nos territórios em causa. O terceiro, é pensar, desenhar e elaborar instrumentos de formação que possam ser apropriados pelas diferentes comunidades e grupos de forma a contribuir para o fortalecimento das suas capacidades colectivas.
Para tal, um grupo internacional de investigação realiza três estudos de caso: em Tolima, Colômbia; em Cabo Delgado, Moçambique e em Urdaibai, País Basco. Usando uma abordagem feminista interseccional, e dando especial atenção às dinâmicas entre o local e o global, esta investigação tem quatro eixos de análise: o acesso à terra; as desigualdades de género; as sustentabilidades; e as identidades culturais.
As Epistemologias do Sul e o Fortalecimento das Capacidades Colectivas são dois marcos teóricos centrais na conceptualização e desenvolvimento deste projecto de investigação-acção e formação.
No sentido de aprofundar e ampliar o debate científico em torno do tema principal do projecto, os territórios em conflito por acção do capitalismo extractivista e financeiro, o patriarcado e o colonialismo da geopolítica do conhecimento, propomo-nos realizar um seminário internacional no CES no próximo dia 28 de Setembro entre as 15h e as 19h. Neste seminário, estarão presentes investigadorxs e activistas dos vários países envolvidos e discutir-se-á tanto algumas questões conceptuais que estão na base do trabalho de investigação-acção quanto se dará atenção ao que já se sabe sobre os casos de Cabo Delgado, Tolima e Urdaibai. O programa do seminário inclui um amplo espaço de discussão e debate sobre as questões saídas da reflexão conjunta. 

Fonte: https://www.ces.uc.pt/pt/agenda-noticias/agenda-de-eventos/2018/epistemologias-do-sul

1 de setembro de 2018

Moçambique: terra de todos, terra de alguns

No Corredor de Nacala, uma das áreas mais férteis e povoadas de Moçambique, milhares de camponeses ficaram sem terra em troca de promessas de uma vida melhor. Hoje, resistem e travam uma luta de David contra Golias com empresas vindas de todo mundo. Portugal, com a Portucel Moçambique à cabeça, é o país da Europa que mais área explora nesta zona.

Vale a pena ler este artigo do PÚBLICO

3 de agosto de 2018

We Are All Climate Refugees Now

Jeffrey D. Sachs     ||     August 2, 2018     ||      Project Syndicate

NEW YORK – Modern humans, born into one climate era, called the Holocene, have crossed the border into another, the Anthropocene. But instead of a Moses guiding humanity in this new and dangerous wilderness, a gang of science deniers and polluters currently misguides humanity to ever-greater danger. We are all climate refugees now and must chart a path to safety. 

The Holocene was the geological age that started more than 10,000 years ago, with favorable climate conditions that supported human civilization as we know it. The Anthropocene is a new geological era with environmental conditions that humanity has never before experienced. Ominously, the Earth’s temperature is now higher than during the Holocene, owing to the carbon dioxide that humanity has emitted into the atmosphere by burning coal, oil, and gas, and by indiscriminately turning the world’s forests and grasslands into farms and pastures.

People are suffering and dying in the new environment, with much worse to come. Hurricane Maria is estimated to have taken more than 4,000 lives in Puerto Rico last September. High-intensity hurricanes are becoming more frequent, and major storms are causing more flooding, because of the increased heat transfer from the warming waters of the oceans, the greater moisture in warmer air, and the rise in sea levels – all made more extreme by human-induced climate change.

Just last month, more than 90 people perished in the suburbs of Athens from a devastating forest fire stoked by drought and high temperatures. Huge forest fires are similarly raging this summer in other hot and newly dry locales, including CaliforniaSwedenBritain, and Australia. Last year, Portugal was devastated. Many record-high temperatures are being reached around the world this summer.

How utterly reckless of humanity to have rushed past the Holocene boundary, ignoring – like a character in a horror movie – all of the obvious warning signs. In 1972, the world’s governments assembled in Stockholm to address the growing environmental threats. In the lead-up to the conference, the Club of Rome published The Limits to Growth, which first introduced the idea of a “sustainable” growth trajectory and the risks of environmental overshooting. Twenty years later, the warning signs flashed brightly in Rio de Janeiro, where United Nations member states assembled at the Earth Summit to adopt the concept of “sustainable development” and to sign three major environmental treaties to halt human-induced global warming, protect biological diversity, and stop land degradation and desertification.

After 1992, the United States, the world’s most powerful country, ostentatiously ignored the three new treaties, signaling to other countries that they could slacken their efforts as well. The US Senate ratified the climate and desertification treaties but did nothing to implement them. And it refused even to ratify the treaty to protect biological diversity, in part because western-state Republicans insisted that landowners have the right to do what they want with their property without international meddling.

More recently, the world adopted the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015 and the Paris climate agreement in December 2015. Yet, once again, the US government has willfully ignored the SDGs, ranking last among the G20 countries in terms of government implementation efforts. And President Donald Trump has declared his intention to pull the US out of the Paris climate agreement at the earliest possible moment, 2020, four years after the accord entered into force.

Worse is to come. The human-caused rise in CO2 hasn’t yet reached its full warming effect, owing to the considerable lag in its impact on ocean temperatures. There is still another 0.5º Celsius or so of warming to occur over the coming decades based on the current concentration of CO2 (408 parts per million) in the atmosphere, and far more warming beyond that if CO2concentrations continue to soar with the business-as-usual burning of fossil fuels. To achieve the Paris agreement’s goal of limiting warming to “well below 2ºC” relative to the pre-industrial level, the world needs to shift decisively from coal, oil, and gas to renewable energy by around 2050, and from deforestation to reforestation and restoration of degraded lands.

So why does humanity keep plunging dumbly ahead, toward certain tragedy?

The main reason is that our political institutions and giant corporations willfully ignore the rising dangers and damage. Politics is about obtaining and holding power and the perks of office, not about solving problems, even life-and-death environmental problems. Managing a major company is about maximizing shareholder value, not about telling the truth or avoiding great harm to the planet. Profit-seeking investors own the major media, or at least influence it through their advertising purchases. Thus, a small yet very powerful group maintains the fossil-fuel-based energy system at growing peril to the rest of humanity today and in the future.

Trump is the latest useful fool doing the polluters’ bidding, abetted by congressional Republicans who finance their election campaigns with contributions from environmental culprits such as Koch Industries. Trump has filled the US government with industry lobbyists who are systematically dismantling every environmental regulation they can reach. Most recently, Trump has nominated a former lawyer for mega-polluter Dow Chemical to lead the Environmental Protection Agency’s Superfund toxic cleanup program. You can’t make this stuff up.

We need a new kind of politics that starts with a clear global goal: environmental safety for the planet’s people, by fulfilling the Paris climate agreement, protecting biodiversity, and cutting pollution, which kills millions each year. The new politics will listen to scientific and technological experts, not self-interested business leaders and narcissistic politicians. Climatologists enable us to gauge the rising dangers. Engineers inform us how to make the rapid transition, by 2050, to zero-carbon energy. Ecologists and agronomists show us how to grow more and better crops on less land while ending deforestation and restoring previously degraded land.

Such a politics is possible. In fact, the public yearns for it. A large majority of the American people, for example, want to fight global warmingstay in the Paris climate agreement, and embrace renewable energy. Yet, as long as a narrow and ignorant elite condemn Americans and the rest of humanity to wander aimlessly in the political desert, the more likely it is that we will all end up in a wasteland from which there will be no escape.
 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/climate-change-disaster-in-the-making-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2018-08

26 de julho de 2018

SEMINÁRIO - Epistemologias do sul: conflitos, resistências e alternativas de vida frente ao capitalismo extractivista e financeiro


28 de setembro de 2018, 15h00


Sala 2, CES | Alta

Resumo

Territórios em conflito: investigação, formação e acção para o fortalecimento de capacidade e a construção de alternativas de vida é um projecto de investigação-acção liderado pelo consórcio Gernika Gogoratuz (GGG) e Gernikatik Mundura (GM), País Basco, em parceria com o Instituto Hegoa da Universidade do País Basco, o Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal, a WLSA Moçambique e a Universidade de Tolima, Colômbia.

Este projecto tem três grandes objectivos. O primeiro é promover um processo de investigação-acção que permita compreender as complexidades presentes nos territórios e os conflitos gerados e alimentados pela ordem neoliberal, patriarcal e extractivista levada a cabo pelas corporações transnacionais. O segundo, é  aprender mais sobre as diversas formas de resistência e alternativas de vida que estão em marcha e fazem frente ao poder transnacional nos territórios em causa. O terceiro, é pensar, desenhar e elaborar instrumentos de formação que possam ser apropriados pelas diferentes comunidades e grupos de forma a contribuir para o fortalecimento das suas capacidades colectivas.

Para tal, um grupo internacional de investigação realiza três estudos de caso: em Tolima, Colômbia; em Cabo Delgado, Moçambique e em Urdaibai, País Basco. Usando uma abordagem feminista interseccional, e dando especial atenção às dinâmicas entre o local e o global, esta investigação tem quatro eixos de análise: o acesso à terra; as desigualdades de género; as sustentabilidades; e as identidades culturais.

As Epistemologias do Sul e o Fortalecimento das Capacidades Colectivas são dois marcos teóricos centrais na conceptualização e desenvolvimento deste projecto de investigação-acção e formação.

No sentido de aprofundar e ampliar o debate científico em torno do tema principal do projecto, os territórios em conflito por acção do capitalismo extractivista e financeiro, o patriarcado e o colonialismo da geopolítica do conhecimento, propomo-nos realizar um seminário internacional no CES no próximo dia 28 de Setembro entre as 15h e as 19h. Neste seminário, estarão presentes investigadorxs e activistas dos vários países envolvidos e discutir-se-á tanto algumas questões conceptuais que estão na base do trabalho de investigação-acção quanto se dará atenção ao que já se sabe sobre os casos de Cabo Delgado, Tolima e Urdaibai. O programa do seminário inclui um amplo espaço de discussão e debate sobre as questões saídas da reflexão conjunta. 

https://ces.uc.pt/pt/agenda-noticias/agenda-de-eventos/2018/epistemologias-do-sul/apresentacao

20 de junho de 2018

2 breves poemas com lágrimas


Source: https://www.instagram.com/michaelfmoore/



O dia amanhece
com o choro das crianças
numa fronteira,
em todas essas fronteiras
que o dinheiro não conhece.


E nada o vento levou…
Ficou cá tudo.
Mudo.
Esperando a sua vez.
Eterna semente que germina:
ganância, ódio, insensatez
(capitalismo, fascismo, populismo)
humana estupidez.


Vasco Coelho

18 de junho de 2018

Three layers of uncertainty. What is happening in Mozambique and why does it matter?



Friday, June 15, 2018 - 18:45




How to understand a Mozambique facing multiple external structural challenges? What can be expected from the country in terms of its longstanding battle for effective peace and national reconciliation? Can it effectively deal with the serious threat posed by Islamic radicalism? Yes or No, the reality is that present-day Mozambique is characterised by potentials for multi-centred crisis which may also lead to multi-centred violence (social uprisings, guerrilla war and Islamic insurgency).

The saga of the hidden loans: a self-inflicted wound?

Until The Wall Street Journal revealed hidden loans totalling roughly US $2 billion in early 2016, Mozambique’s economy had experienced consistent growth. Since the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had consistently risen at 7.4 percent per year. This growth rate was attributed to post-war neoliberal economic reforms and was considerably above its population growth rate of 2.5 percent, constituting one of the highest economic growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this growth had marginal impact on the livelihoods of its population, as poverty levels remained high. 2017 estimates, for example, put 46.1 percent of an estimated population of 28.8 million people below the poverty line. [[1]]

Economic growth in Mozambique is highly dependent on the extractivist sector, a sector from which most of its population (rural poor working in small scale farming) is totally disconnected. [[2]] Declining prices for traditional export commodities (e.g. coal), the persistent drought caused by El Niño, domestic political and military instability combined with significant drops in foreign direct invest led to an historic drop in average growth to only 3.8 percent in 2016. That said, a sharp increase is projected for 2018 (5.3 percent). [[3]]

Coming from external debts equalling 60 percent of the national GDP in the mid-1980s, in 2001 Mozambique qualified for US $4.3 billion of debt cancelation under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. In 2005, a further US $2 billion was cancelled under the Multilateral Debt Relief initiative, resulting in government debt payments falling to just one percent of state revenues by 2007. [[4]]

In recognition of this “economic success”, Maputo hosted the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s prestigious “Africa Rising Conference” on 29-30 May 2014. [[5]] Addressing conference participants, the IMF Managing Director commended Mozambique for what she called “impressive economic performance”. [[6]] Yet only four years after the IMF meeting, hidden loans led to the unsustainability of Mozambique’s debt, which now stands at 112 percent of GDP (2018).

The revelation of hidden state-guaranteed loans prompted the IMF to immediately suspend further loan payments to Mozambique. The G14 Group (a group of international contributors to the state budget) also suspended its payments to the country. The United States announced a review of its support to the country. Together, these donors provided about a quarter of the country’s state budget. This suspension was, as pointed by Christine Largarde, justified by signs of corruption.

Facing enormous domestic and international pressure, the government of Mozambique responded, engaging the international audit company Kroll to complete an independent audit of the US $2 billion with financial support from the Swedish Embassy. In August 2016, a parliamentary commission of enquiry was formed to investigate. The commission concluded that the country’s constitution had been violated, yet neglected to charge any specific individuals.

The companies involved in the illegal loans are well known: Proindicus S.A, Empresa Moçambicana de Atum S.A (EMATUM) and Mozambique Asset Management S.A (MAM). These companies are officially said to have been created to provide Mozambique with the means to protect its sovereignty over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as well as to explore natural resources within this economic zone. The credits for Proindicus were for acquiring monitoring and protection solutions for the country’s EEZ. EMATUM’s were for developing a home-grown and self-sustaining fishing industry, while MAM’s were for offering mobile maintenance and repair services to EMATUM and Proindicus vessels and others exploring oil and gas assets in the country. Those arranging these hidden loan agreements are also well-known: Credit Suisse International for Proindicus and EMATUM, and the Russian Investment Bank VTB Capital PLC for MAM. In conducting this audit, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Mozambique (PGR) sought to assess the existence of any irregularities or criminal offenses in the procurement contracts and operations of the Mozambican companies involved. 

The process leading to the audit’s completion revealed how weak and vulnerable to political manipulation Mozambique’s legal institutions are. Access to information was cited by the auditing company Kroll as the main obstacle to completing the audit. Although led by instructions from the country’s PGR, some of the people involved refused to provide auditors with the information required, arguing it was “classified”. Nevertheless, among other important findings the audit was able to establish that US $500 million of the EMATUM loan had gone missing. This amount was said to have been used for the purchase of maritime equipment, which was never actually acquired.

Yet long before the audit’s conclusion, the PGR identified violations of budgetary legislation and non-compliance with the country’s legal procedures in the government’s granting of guarantees to the three companies. These actions constitute criminal acts, namely, abuse of office or function. [[7]] Three years after a criminal case was opened in 2015 and with the final audit report already in the hands of Mozambique’s legal authorities, no one has been charged. The complexity involved in investigating these loans and the fact that they require judiciary international cooperation are the reasons put forward by the PGR for its lack of progress. [[8]] This is to some extent a valid argument – not only because these credit institutions are located abroad, but also because they were responsible for verifying compliance of domestic legislation by the Mozambican government before approving such loans.

Meanwhile, it is has been reported that the affair constitutes a high-level corruption case implicating executive personnel in Mozambique’s secret service and the former and the current president, together with other important Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) cadres. [[9]] It is also believed that the real reason the case has been held back is its potential to cause serious internal divisions within the ruling FRELIMO. With local elections due on 10 October 2018 and general elections (legislative, presidential and provincials) due on 15 October 2019, this could have serious consequences on voters’ behaviour, especially in the urban areas.

While the case seems to be stalled at the legal level, ordinary Mozambicans are already suffering from the socioeconomic impacts of the crisis. Inflation indicators have deteriorated rapidly. In November 2016 it reached an all-time high of 26.35 percent – food prices doubled, bank interest rates increased significantly affecting investment and consumption, investment rates in the economy fell about 30 percent, and imports fell 4.7 percent. [[10]] More importantly, the government has stopped subsidising bread and recently announced its intention to do the same with fuels. [[11]] Some hospitals including the country’s largest one in Maputo have since been running with shortage of chemical reagents. It has also been reported that an increasing number of much needed small and medium enterprises have closed and sent their employees home. [[12]] On 18 June 2016, a march against the country’s political and the economic situation organised in Maputo was met by a heavy police presence. A month before the demonstration, the president of the Ecologist Party Movement for Land, João Massango, was brutally attacked by “strangers” when trying to organise a similar march. Like most political cases, nobody has been charged.      

Did hopes for effective peace die with Dhlakama?

Afonso Dhlakama died during a very crucial phase for the peace negotiations, directly led by him and Mozambican president Filipe Nyusi. Mozambique’s on-going peace process is comprised of two packages: decentralisation and de-concentration, and re (integration) of RENAMO’s guerrilla into the Mozambican defence and security forces (military, police and secret services). Prior to Dhlakama’s death on 3 May 2018, an agreement was reached concerning the decentralisation and de-concentration package, while the rest was still being discussed. As a result of the agreement, Mozambique’s parliament unanimously approved a series of constitutional amendments on 23 May 2018 allowing for the indirect election of mayors, provincial governors and district administrators. This was perceived internally as a crucial gain for the country’s democracy. Ironically, Mozambique’s democracy may have indirectly “benefitted” from Dhlakama’s death in the sense that it made the current president into the sole leader of the whole peace process. President Nyusi now must continue peace negotiations by obtaining concessions inside his ruling party (which are usually hard to obtain when pushed for from outside), and with the opposition RENAMO (the proponent) ascribing the process very high chances of success. 
  
After the 2014 general election, RENAMO’s most ambitious demand was that of territorial autonomy. RENAMO demanded that the provinces in which it received a majority (Sofala, Manica, Tete, Nampula and Zambézia) be turned into autonomous territories under its rule. This demand, promptly rejected by the FRELIMO parliamentary majority on 30 April 2015, was based on RENAMO’s claim that the electoral process, which gave victory to the current president and the ruling party, was all but free, fair and transparent. For RENAMO, autonomous provinces would be the only way to resolve this electoral quarrel.
After having survived two attempts on his life (perceived to have been conducted by government forces), Dhlakama retreated to the mountains of Gorongosa from where he led small-scale guerrilla attacks against government forces. After attempts by domestic and international peace facilitators failed, the two leaders decided to open direct negotiations. These gave birth to the recently approved parliamentary proposal regarding constitutional amendments. The military question remains to be decided.

Under Protocol IV of the 1992 General Peace agreement (on military issues), it was agreed that the country should have a 30 thousand-strong army to which the government and RENAMO would each contribute 50 percent.  The remaining troops not integrated into the country’s new army would be disarmed, demobilised and re-integrated into civilian life. However, it is said that an arrangement was made permitting RENAMO to maintain a small armed reserve force to provide security to its leadership. RENAMO also retained some of its military bases, particularly in the provinces of Nampula and Sofala. RENAMO’s current military power is understood to be made up of Dhlakama’s security personnel and others who, according to RENAMO, were unfairly demobilised by Mozambique’s government. The objective of RENAMO in this regard appears to be two-fold: 1) to fight for re-integration of its troops in all ranks of the country’s military and police force (including the secret service) which will also 2) give Mozambique a republican army not controlled by FRELIMO.
Mozambique has conducted periodic multiparty elections since 1994 (the civil war ended in 1992). FRELIMO won all the general elections held so far (Joaquim Chissano in 1994 and 1999, Armando Guebuza in 2004 and 2009, and now Filipe Jacinto Nyusi in 2014), and most provincial and local elections as well. All these electoral processes have been highly contested by RENAMO. RENAMO’s contestations (against the fairness of the electoral processes) came to a head in 2012. After 20 years of apparent peace and stability, RENAMO returned to armed struggle to demand, among others things, a revision of the country’s electoral legislation, which it claimed (as is generally accepted) favours the ruling FRELIMO. The electoral legislation was duly amended. Although a cease-fire agreement was signed between RENAMO and the Mozambican government on 25 August 2014, political instability continued to prevail and was further aggravated by the results of the 2014 general elections.  

Three days after the death of Dhlakama, RENAMO’s national political commission appointed lieutenant general Ossufo Momade national coordinator of the commission. Very little is known about the acting leader of RENAMO. However, he has extensive military experience. [[13]] By appointing a historical member of its military wing to temporarily lead RENAMO, the party must be trying to exert pressure on the ruling FRELIMO to speed up the outstanding military issues. On the other hand, RENAMO must be trying to send a message that the death of Dhlakama does not spell the end of its military power, which has been the main and most effect tool in wresting political concession from the ruling FRELIMO. In fact, RENAMO’s national political commission deliberated with immediate effect and announced on 4 June 2018 that Ossufo Momade must reside in their military base in Gorongosa. [[14]] The most important political concessions made by FRELIMO have been obtained through the use of violence. This is on face a discouraging factor as far as the full demilitarisation of RENAMO is concerned, and for nonviolent democratic development in Mozambique more generally. 

However, despite having governed RENAMO autocratically and centralising all major political and military decision making in his own hands, Dhlakama was able to build a coherent and concise hybrid force. While on one side, by military means, the guerrillas push for military and political issues from the bush (e.g. their re-integration into the national army and police, amendments to the electoral legislation, de-centralisation and de-concentration), the political wing on the other pushes for the very same agenda by political means in parliamentary sessions in Maputo, constituting a single voice. [[15]]
There is no doubt that the future of Mozambican peace depends on the political will of the country’s principal political forces, but especially on the ruling party. It is generally perceived that more political de-centralisation and de-concentration will expand the possibilities of other political forces (including some currently marginalised local elites) to access political and economic power in the country. In addition to this, it is also generally believed that the ruling party controls the military and the police force and uses them to suppress opposition to both the government and FRELIMO.

The Islamic question: radicalism, banditry or emancipation?

How to understand the Islamic question (or insurgency) in northern Mozambique? Is the country facing a local manifestation of global Islamic radicalism (which opposes Western-style democracy, democratic institutions such as the rule of law, individual liberties and mutual tolerance of different faiths and beliefs) defined by the West as Islamist terrorism? Is Mozambique threatened by a group of mere bandits who use Islam as a pretext to create chaos locally in order to profit from economic opportunities? Can the events on the ground also be seen as a particular form of local political emancipation of the local Muslim population, which has suffered from centuries of marginalisation both by the processes of colonialism, independence and now by the process of development?  

I do not aim to answer any of these questions directly. However, I highlight the need to apply different analytical perspectives to the current Islamic question in Mozambique in order to better understand and properly explain it.

Mozambique in its current form is a product of an Anglo-Portuguese treaty signed in May 1891. [[16]] To understand the Islamic question and the emergence of Islamic radicalism in that particular region, one must also understand Mozambique’s pre-colonial history. Mozambique’s Islamic community is a product of contact between Arab traders and the local population, which dates back to the fourth century, well before the first contact with the Portuguese in 1498. Islam penetrated the coastal northern of Mozambique in the eight century, and since then it is said to have peacefully coexisted with local traditional cultural beliefs like witchcraft.

Arab trading settlements along the coast and some islands already existed for several centuries before the arrival of the Portuguese, and local sultans had political control of the coast.  Vast territories of the extreme north of the country once belonged to the Omani Sultanate and Omani Arabs controlled much of Indian Ocean trade. [[17]] The Swahili language spoken by the local population borrowed a significant amount of words from Arabic. [[18]] Data from the southern coast of Inhambane province even indicates that the southern Mozambican littoral was also part of the Indian Ocean trading networks operating within the sphere of the Swahili and Islamic economic and cultural influence since at least the eighth century. It was only beginning in 1505 with the Portuguese occupation of Kilwa, the Island of Mozambique, Sofala and Cuma (later on Kilimani, Inhambane, Bazaruto Islands and others) that Swahili Muslims lost political control over the territory. [[19]]

According to some sources, initially no concerted effort was made by the Portuguese to interfere with local Muslim religious affairs, at least until after they took full control of the territory through military conquest and imposed an administrative colonial system at the beginning of the 20th century. [[20]] Following Mozambican independence in 1975, FRELIMO’s atheist Marxist-Leninist state ideology marginalised local Muslims, prompting some of them to give their support to RENAMO. In fact, today RENAMO enjoys significant support from the populations of coastal northern Mozambique, likely as a result of these historical dynamics.  
     
According to 2007 population statistics, 17.9 percent of Mozambique’s total population is Muslim. A plurality, however, is Roman Catholic (28.4 percent). [[21]] The vast majority of Mozambican [2] Muslims are Sunni [3] and consist primarily of indigenous Mozambicans (Indian [4] and Pakistani [5] descent) and a very small number of North African [6] and Middle Eastern immigrants.  This so far peaceful coexistence has led some to believe that due to the particular nature of Islam in Mozambique, the potential for radicalism was insignificant.  At least until now.  

Accurate information concerning events on the ground is hard to obtain due to scarce official data, likely due to the potential these events have to threaten much-needed foreign direct investment in the country. Independent academic studies are also very limited and are not the product of thorough scholarly research with clear conclusions. Although attacks largely targeting local police stations began in October 2017, they reached horrendous proportions on 29 May 2018. Mozambicans and the world were confronted by extremely shocking videos on social media platforms showing beheaded bodies of ten people, including children. This brutal tactic may reveal how fast and deep the insurgents have radicalised. It is reported that the decapitated victims were people from the village of Monjane (Palma district). Monjane is close to the fragile border with Tanzania and not far from Palma, a small town soon to be transformed into the country’s new natural gas hub in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. [[22]]

Discoveries of huge quantities of offshore gas in the Rovuma Basin off Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province promised to transform the country’s fortunes. The project aims to begin producing US $1.5 billion worth of gas per year by 2022. The Italian company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi S.p.A. has secured a purchasing contract with British Petroleum, which will buy gas for 20 years. It is also predicted that these discoveries will turn Mozambique into the world’s third-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. [[23]]

While links between the gas project and the Islamic question are yet to be established, the group in that particular area may also have been attracted by the possibility of profiting from human trafficking when Palma becomes a major industrial complex in the near future. It is also important not to ignore that these investments may have triggered discontent among marginalised local elites since the major economic benefits are already being captured by the minority Makonde elite and others mainly based in the capital city of Maputo. [[24]] On the other hand, it is important to ask whether or not the current violence is associated with forms of local reclamation of political and religious pre-colonial institutions, which once dominated the territory and were suppressed by colonialism and independence. This hypothesis should not be ignored and requires scientific study.

Locals call the group “Al-Shabaab”, although they appear to have no direct links with the Somali group of the same name. The group’s real name is Ansar al-Sunna, which in English means “supporters of tradition”. The little information about the group available suggests that it arose in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado first as a religious group, but by 2015 began to radicalise further and include military cells. [[25]] It calls for the implementation of Sharia law and refuses to recognise Mozambican law. Training camps are said to be located in the Cabo Delgado districts of Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia and Montepuez, where training is provided by former Mozambican police personnel. Nuro Adremane and Jafar Alawi are said to be the leaders of the group. In terms of composition, the group includes Mozambicans, Tanzanians and Somalis. Poaching, trafficking in ruby, timber and wood are said to be the group’s main source of income, which are mainly used to purchase military equipment and communication.

Important warnings

Should Mozambique fail to get its economy back on track, social uprisings similar to or more violent than the riots it experienced in the capital city of Maputo and Matola (with minor incidence in Gaza and Manica Provinces) resulting in 13 deaths on 1 and 2 September 2010 can be expected. These riots followed the earlier 5 February 2008 riots over fuel and transport prices, which took place in a similar context. Adding to this is the fact that 2018 is an election year in the country. FRELIMO’s usual difficulty to concede electoral defeat in some major urban municipalities combined with high levels of popular discontentment may create a perfect storm for post-electoral violence. To get its economy back on tract, apart from other economic measures, Mozambique must resume a normal relationship with its financial partners by legally resolving the hidden debts as soon as possible. Resuming its relationship with financial partners will also allow it to go back to the markets.

The death of Dhlakama appears not to have caused any leadership vacuum within RENAMO thus far. What is not known, however, is whether the current leadership enjoys the same level of loyalty as Dhlakama did both in the military and political wings of the party. In this case, it is essential that the outstanding aspects hampering progress in the re-integration of RENAMO soldiers into the national army and police force be expedited before RENAMO’s soldiers lose hope and trust in their current leadership and revert back to violence.  

The Islamic question in Mozambique requires independent scientific inquiry and analysis. Meanwhile, if the current insurgency is not grasped as a regional threat and dealt with collectively with neighbouring countries, Mozambique may easily become a regional hub for radical Islamic terrorism, attracting insurgents from other places. It is urgent and vital that the Southern Africa Development Community immediately begin to engage with the Mozambican government to help it resolve this dangerous threat to regional stability.


* Fredson G. Guilengue is Regional Deputy Director at the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung – Southern Africa based in Johannesburg, South Africa. He has published extensively on Mozambican politics, from working papers to opinion articles in both English and Portuguese.

Endnotes

[1] Index Mundi (2018) Mozambique Population below poverty line, 1 June 2018, available at  https://www.indexmundi.com/mozambique/population_below_poverty_line.html [7]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018; Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). Gabinete do Presidente. IV Recenseamento geral da população e habitação. Resultados Preliminares do Censo 2017. IV RGPH 2017
[2] The World Bank (2018), Accelerating poverty reduction in Mozambique:Challenges and opportinities, 5 June 2018, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/publication/accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-mozambique-challenges-and-opportunities [8]. Last accessed 5 June 2018. 
[3] Associação Moçambicana de Bancos (2018), FMI mantém previsão de crescimento do PIB em 5.3%, 5 June 2018, available at http://www.amb.co.mz/index.php/notas-de-imoprensa/notas-de-imprensa/362-fmi-mantem-previsao-de-crescimento-do-pib-em-5-3 [9]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018; African Development Bank Group (2018), Mozambique economic outlook, 5 June 2018, available at https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/mozambique/mozambique-economic-outlook/ [10]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[4] Jubilee Debt Campaign (2018), Mozambique: secret loans and unjust             debts, available at https://jubileedebt.org.uk/countries-in-crisis/mozambique-secret-loans-unjust-debts [11]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018.
[5] Africa Rising (2014), Republic of Mozambique – International Monetary Fund Conference, 29-30 May 2014, available at http://www.africa-rising.org/ [12]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[6] International Monetary Fund (2014), Africa Rising – Building to the future, keynote address by Christine Lagarde, Managing Director, IMF, 29 May 2014, available at http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp052914 [13]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018. 
[7]DW(2016), aprovada comissão de inquérito à dívida pública moçambicana, 26 July 2016, available at http://www.dw.com/pt-002/aprovada-comiss%C3%A3o-de-inqu%C3%A9rito-%C3%A0-d%C3%ADvida-p%C3%BAblica-mo%C3%A7ambicana/a-19428348 [14]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018 
[8] DW (2017), Moçambique: oposição critica relatório “sem soluções” da PGR, 19 April 2017, available at http://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-oposi%C3%A7%C3%A3o-critica-relat%C3%B3rio-sem-solu%C3%A7%C3%B5es-da-pgr/a-38494137 [15]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018 
[9] VOA (2018), descodificação do individuo “Q” no caso das dívidas ocultas “exige” resposta de Nyusi, 30 April 2018, available at https://www.voaportugues.com/a/descodifica%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-indiv%C3%ADduo-q-no-caso-das-d%C3%ADvidas-ocultas-exige-resposta-de-nyusi/4371058.html [16]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018; Verdade (2016), Manuel Chang assinou (violando a lei) as garantias dos empréstimos da Proíndicus, EMATUM e MAM em nome da República de Moçambique, available at  http://www.verdade.co.mz/tema-de-fundo/35-themadefundo/59752-manuel-chang-assinou-as-garantias-dos-emprestimos-da-proindicus-ematum-e-mam-em-nome-da-republica-de-mocambique [17]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018; Saponotícias (2017), governo “surpreso” com alegada lista de beneficiários das dívidas ocultas, available at https://noticias.sapo.mz/actualidade/artigos/governo-surpreso-com-alegada-lista-de-beneficiarios-das-dividas-ocultas [18]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018.   
[10] DNLUSA (2018), Moçambique quer eliminar subsídios para combustíveis de transportes, 17 April 2018, available at https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/mocambique-quer-eliminar-subsidio-para-combustiveis-de-transportes-9267016.html [19]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018. 
[11]RTPNotícias (2017), governo moçambicano retira subsidio ao pão, 31 March 2017, available at  https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/governo-mocambicano-retira-subsidio-ao-pao_n992413 [20]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018; Mosca, J and Rabia Aiuba (2017). Conjuntura Económica da Críse das Dívidas Ocultas. Forum de Monitoria do Orçamento.
[12] RFI (2016), Crise moçambicana obriga empresas fechar as portas, 12 July 2016, available at http://pt.rfi.fr/mocambique/20160712-crise-mocambicana-obriga-empresas-fechar-portas [21]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[13] Club of Mozambique (2018), Mozambique: who is Ossufo Momade RENAMO’s newly appointed interim leader?, 8 May 2018, available at http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-who-is-ossufo-momade-RENAMOs-newly-appointed-interim-leader/ [22]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[14] OPais (2018), Ossufo Momade passa a residir na serra da gorongosa, 4 July 2018, available at http://opais.sapo.mz/ossufo-momade-passa-a-residir-na-serra-da-gorongosa [23]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018.
[15] Guilengue, Fredson (2014). RENAMO: a three-sided coin? Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Southern Africa, International Politics (3) pp:1-9
[16] Newitt, M (1995) A History of Mozambique. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. 
[17] Wikipedia (2018), History of Mozambique, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Mozambique#Intercultural_Contact [24]. Last Accessed: 5 June 2018
[18] Wikipedia (2018), Islam in Mozambique, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Mozambique [25]https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-beliefs-in-mozambique.html[26]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[20] Idem
[21] Zionist Christian (15.5%), Protestant 12.2% (includes Pentecostal 10.9% and Anglican 1.3%), other 6.7%, none 18.7%, unspecified 0.7%. 2017 statistics will be published in June 2018; Central Intelligence Agency  (2018), the world fact book, 24 May 2018, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html [28]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[22] BusinessDay (2018), Ten beheaded by suspected islamists in mozambique village, 29 May 2018, available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-05-29-ten-beheaded-by-suspected-islamists-in-mozambique-village/ [29]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018
[23] FinancialTimes (2018), Mozambique offshore gas promises great rewards – but not yet, available at https://www.ft.com/content/39f0b2be-a2b0-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849 [30]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018. 
[24] The Makonde live throughout Tanzania and Mozambique and have a small presence in Kenya [31]. The Makonde population in Tanzania was estimated in 2001 to be 1,140,000, and the 1997 census in Mozambique put the Makonde population in that country at 233,358, for a total estimate of 1,373,358. Mozambique’s current president belongs to this tribe and most of the country’s current elite are said to have come from or to have strong linkage with the tribe. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makonde_people [32]. Wikipedia (2018), the Makonde people, available at http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2013/08/elite-pol%C3%ADtica-... [33]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018 
[25] AllAfrica (2018), Mozambique: Former policemen train Islamic group, 30 April 2018, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201805010190.html [34]. Last accessed: 5 June 2018



Links:
[1] https://www.pambazuka.org/author/fredson-g-guilengue
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozambique
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Africa
[7] https://www.indexmundi.com/mozambique/population_below_poverty_line.html
[8] http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mozambique/publication/accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-mozambique-challenges-and-opportunities
[9] http://www.amb.co.mz/index.php/notas-de-imoprensa/notas-de-imprensa/362-fmi-mantem-previsao-de-crescimento-do-pib-em-5-3
[10] https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/mozambique/mozambique-economic-outlook/
[11] https://jubileedebt.org.uk/countries-in-crisis/mozambique-secret-loans-unjust-debts
[12] http://www.africa-rising.org/
[13] http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp052914
[14] http://www.dw.com/pt-002/aprovada-comiss%C3%A3o-de-inqu%C3%A9rito-%C3%A0-d%C3%ADvida-p%C3%BAblica-mo%C3%A7ambicana/a-19428348
[15] http://www.dw.com/pt-002/mo%C3%A7ambique-oposi%C3%A7%C3%A3o-critica-relat%C3%B3rio-sem-solu%C3%A7%C3%B5es-da-pgr/a-38494137
[16] https://www.voaportugues.com/a/descodifica%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-indiv%C3%ADduo-q-no-caso-das-d%C3%ADvidas-ocultas-exige-resposta-de-nyusi/4371058.html
[17] http://www.verdade.co.mz/tema-de-fundo/35-themadefundo/59752-manuel-chang-assinou-as-garantias-dos-emprestimos-da-proindicus-ematum-e-mam-em-nome-da-republica-de-mocambique
[18] https://noticias.sapo.mz/actualidade/artigos/governo-surpreso-com-alegada-lista-de-beneficiarios-das-dividas-ocultas
[19] https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/mocambique-quer-eliminar-subsidio-para-combustiveis-de-transportes-9267016.html
[20] https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/governo-mocambicano-retira-subsidio-ao-pao_n992413
[21] http://pt.rfi.fr/mocambique/20160712-crise-mocambicana-obriga-empresas-fechar-portas
[22] http://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-who-is-ossufo-momade-renamos-newly-appointed-interim-leader/
[23] http://opais.sapo.mz/ossufo-momade-passa-a-residir-na-serra-da-gorongosa
[24] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Mozambique%23Intercultural_Contact
[25] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Mozambique
[26] https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-beliefs-in-mozambique.html
[27] https://scholar.google.com/scholar?oi=bibs&cluster=15152248198701120662&btnI=1&hl=en
[28] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html
[29] https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-05-29-ten-beheaded-by-suspected-islamists-in-mozambique-village/
[30] https://www.ft.com/content/39f0b2be-a2b0-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849
[31] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya
[32] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makonde_people
[33] http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2013/08/elite-pol%C3%ADtica-mo%C3%A7ambicana-%C3%A0-ca%C3%A7a-de-contratos-de-presta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-servi%C3%A7os-na-ind%C3%BAstria-extractiva.html
[34] http://allafrica.com/stories/201805010190.html
[35] https://www.pambazuka.org/tags/mozambique-debt-crisis
[36] https://www.pambazuka.org/article-issue/866
[37] https://www.pambazuka.org/print/99173
[38] https://www.pambazuka.org/category/economics
[39] https://www.pambazuka.org/taxonomy/term/3301